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This article addresses nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 
accountability, relationship with stakeholders, and what kind of 
mechanisms - tools or processes have NGOs put in place to 
ensure all types of accountabilities. The assumption in this study 
is that Palestinian NGOs, individually and collectively, are more 
accountable to their donors and to the Palestinian Authority to a 
lesser extent as NGOs need these two which are the only 
stakeholders with a real power to exercise on the NGOs and 
enforce their accountability requirements. The research argues 
that stakeholders’ power is therefore determining NGO 
accountability. The findings highlighted the failure of NGOs in 
meeting the most pressing needs of the public and the poor in 
particular. The upward-accountability also signals of the sector’s 
inability to consolidate its legitimacy or define an agenda or 
develop down-ward accountability. On top of that, political 
parties’ involvement in the non-profit organizations is another 
factor that has compounded the sector’s lack of public 
accountability, negative competitiveness, fragmentation, self-
serving leadership, and exploitation as a substitute of political 
arena.  In NGOs’ opinion, the relationships to various 
stakeholders range from satisfactory to good especially where 
the PA, foreign donors, and political factions are concerned. The 
PA’s hostility towards NGOs stems from suspicion of their 
political or donor affiliations and NGOs critique of PA policies 
and performance. However, NGOs accountability flows towards 
two powerful external stakeholders, the donors and the PA. 
Consequently, the NGOs are more concerned with upward 
accountability than with down-ward ones such as to the general 
public and the non-profit sector as a whole.  Finally, NGOs 
accountability dilemma is both a cause and a result of low level 
of public participation in NGOs affairs due to public’s lack of trust 
and the general feeling that NGOs are distant, self-absorbed, 
and wasting foreign funds on activities lacking sufficient 
relevance to actual needs. 
This conclusion based on huge investigation, a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, survey, interview, 
focus groups in the West Bank, gathering huge data to build a 
theory from the field  
ABSTRAK 
 Artikel ini membahas akuntabilitas organisasi 








kepentingan, dan mekanisme seperti apa - alat atau 
proses yang dimiliki LSM untuk memastikan semua jenis 
akuntabilitas. Asumsi dalam penelitian ini adalah bahwa 
LSM Palestina, secara individu dan kolektif, lebih 
bertanggung jawab kepada donor mereka dan kepada 
Otoritas Palestina pada tingkat yang lebih rendah karena 
LSM membutuhkan kedua yang merupakan satu-satunya 
pemangku kepentingan dengan kekuatan nyata untuk 
melaksanakan pada LSM dan menegakkan persyaratan 
akuntabilitas mereka. Penelitian ini berpendapat bahwa 
kekuatan pemangku kepentingan karenanya menentukan 
akuntabilitas LSM. Temuan ini menyoroti kegagalan LSM 
dalam memenuhi kebutuhan paling mendesak dari 
masyarakat dan orang miskin pada khususnya. 
Akuntabilitas ke atas juga menandakan ketidakmampuan 
sektor untuk mengkonsolidasikan legitimasinya atau 
mendefinisikan agenda atau mengembangkan 
akuntabilitas di tingkat bawah. Di atas itu, keterlibatan 
partai politik dalam organisasi nirlaba adalah faktor lain 
yang telah memperumit kurangnya akuntabilitas publik, 
daya saing negatif, fragmentasi, kepemimpinan yang 
melayani diri sendiri, dan eksploitasi sebagai pengganti 
arena politik. Menurut pendapat LSM, hubungan dengan 
berbagai pemangku kepentingan berkisar dari memuaskan 
hingga baik, terutama ketika PA, donor asing, dan fraksi 
politik prihatin. Permusuhan PA terhadap LSM berasal dari 
kecurigaan afiliasi politik atau donor mereka dan kritik LSM 
terhadap kebijakan dan kinerja PA. Namun, akuntabilitas 
LSM mengalir ke arah dua pemangku kepentingan 
eksternal yang kuat, para donor dan PA. Konsekuensinya, 
LSM lebih peduli dengan akuntabilitas ke atas daripada 
dengan yang lebih rendah seperti ke masyarakat umum 
dan sektor nirlaba secara keseluruhan. Akhirnya, dilema 
akuntabilitas LSM merupakan penyebab dan akibat 
rendahnya tingkat partisipasi publik dalam urusan LSM 
karena kurangnya kepercayaan masyarakat dan perasaan 
umum bahwa LSM berada jauh, menyerap diri, dan 
membuang dana asing pada kegiatan yang tidak memiliki 
relevansi yang cukup untuk kebutuhan sebenarnya. 
Kesimpulan ini didasarkan pada penyelidikan besar, 
kombinasi metodologi kualitatif dan kuantitatif, survei, 
wawancara, kelompok fokus di Tepi Barat, mengumpulkan 
data besar untuk membangun teori dari lapangan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Governance refers to “all the ways in which people collectively make 
choices” (Florini cited in McIntyre-Mills, 2008, p. 19). For 
organizations, stakeholders come together to cooperate tactically on 
the short term to accomplish their common interests and goals. 
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Recognizing the transitory nature of common goals and power of self-
interest, Lord Palmerston once said “a country does not have 
permanent friends, only permanent interests" (Weijiang, 2010,  para. 
18). This means that ethical values and social interests should be the 
most important aspects to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 
governance when taking decisions affecting present and future 
generations (McIntyre-Mills, 2008, p.  XXXVIII).  
 
Previous researchers show that foreign aid has positive and negative 
outcomes at almost all levels: economic, political and social as well as 
at the NGOs sector. So instead of rejecting foreign aid, Palestinian 
organizations want to reform aid management, because this is the 
only proposition that allows funding flow to continue. Even with that 
call, NGOs have yet to develop a unified vision of community work 
and an agenda for the non-profit sector in line with people’s 
expectations, needs and goals.  
 
This article addresses NGOs accountability and relationship with 
stakeholders. Taking into consideration the Palestinian people as 
their life is affected by decisions taken by local or international actors, 
the research tries to answer three important questions: Firstly, what is 
the nature of current NGOs relationship with stakeholders, and to 
what extent politics and money play a role in relationship dynamic? 
Secondly, to what extent the Palestinian NGOs are accountable to 
their stakeholders namely: local communities/ or public, Palestinian 
Authority (PA), donors, and the Palestinian national goals? Thirdly, 
what kind of mechanisms, tools or processes have NGOs put in place 
to ensure all types of accountabilities? The answers will shed more 
light on NGOs accountability (internal and external) towards their 
stakeholders, especially towards local communities and the public at 
large. To serve this purpose, the article investigates different topics to 
reflect on NGOs external accountability because NGOs participate in 
‘state’ building and are responsible for building trust with their 
constituencies and stakeholders. The assumption in this study is that 
Palestinian NGOs, individually and collectively, are more accountable 
to their donors and to the Palestinian Authority to a lesser extent as 








power to exercise on the NGOs and enforce their accountability 
requirements. The research argues that stakeholders’ power is 
therefore determining NGO accountability direction. For various 
reasons, NGO-donor relationship is stronger than NGO- PA 
relationship which obligates NGOs to remain accountable to donors 
to ensure sustainability of funding. On the other hand, NGOs are 
forced to fulfilling PA legal requirements, even when illegal, because 
the PA can exercise coercive power on the NGO sector. 
 
To investigate on this issue, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methodology has adopted, using primary and secondary 
data over NGOs in the West Bank to build a theory from the field.  
Five main data collection instruments uses here: (1) a structured six-
page survey was distributed to a pre-selected sample of forty 
organizations. 40 adult respondents selected from NGOs across the 
West Bank. A perception survey on the opinions and positions of 100 
NGO staff members carried out using a one-page structured survey. 
(2) Face to face interviews with 53 interviewees representing a wide 
range of NGOs, relevant PA institutions, local organizations, donors, 
and civil society activists and experts. Each semi-structure interview 
took 1/2 -2 hours to complete, especially if the interviewee has many 
professional capacities or formal roles in the community (i.e. 
university professors, mayors, and NGO board members, etc. (3) 
Three focus group discussions for NGOs members and activists in the 
West Bank. The researcher called selected organizations to explain 
the purpose and nature of the research and the issues to be addressed 
in the focus groups, and agree on suitable day, time, place, and other 
logistical issues1 . The three- hour focus groups were held: one in 
district of Tulkarem, El-Kafreyat rural areas, and two more held in 
the town of Beit Rima and Al-Amari Refugee camp in Ramallah 
district. The second focus group in Ramallah had participants 
selected from refugee camps in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Jericho 
                                                          
1
 Sometimes, I spent the entire day was spent in one community doing 
interviewing and talking to the residents as well as to gain people’s trust prior to 
data collection. Some locations preferred meeting in the afternoon or in weekends 
and demanded that I make arrangement for their transport.  
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districts. (4) Three case studies were undertaken on a number of urban 
and rural-based CBOs and NGOs in the target districts. The case 
studies were developed through interviews and additional focus 
groups discussions. The target localities were chosen because of the 
researcher’s familiarity with their social contexts and for their physical 
proximity conducive to frequent field visits for data collection. (5) In 
addition, six exploratory meetings with key informants and experts were 
held to solicit their views and ideas on the issues under investigation. 
They are located in the city of Ramallah and approached on their 
expertise and ability of cooperation. 
The research is divided into four sections; the first section discusses 
stakeholders’ expectations of NGOs while the second section 
addresses NGOs relationship with their stakeholders such as the PA, 
political factions and local governments. The third section discusses 
NGOs accountability to the NGOs sector, future generations and the 
Palestinian national goals. The last section covers NGOs legitimacy 
and identity and describes the prevailing mentality of accountability 
within the non-profit sector in the oPt. 
 
 
Stakeholders Expectations of NGOs 
‘Stakeholders’ is originally a private sector concept delineating those 
with ownership-based power, i.e. owners of the majority of stocks in a 
firm (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). NGOs have several 
stakeholders, most important are four: donors, the state, NGO 
governing bodies, and the general public.  
Previous research established that the main public needs are: poverty 
reduction, employment generation and improvement of education 
and health services. NGOs give primacy to these practical needs over 
the collective national rights. The politically-motivated foreign 
funding helps mitigate the negative impact of occupation and sustain 
the PA not as a sovereign state but as Palestinian self-rule machinery 
co-existing with the occupation. Instead of being on equal footing 
with their partner NGOs, donors are the most powerful party due to 
their financial strengths (DW., interview, 22 April). Donors also 








public policy agendas all seen as Western and donor-driven political 
agendas (EH., interview, 15 December).  
This research does not focus on ‘basic needs for survival’ but rather 
adopts the notion of community needs in a general sense and what 
people believe is necessary to enhance the quality of their lives. As a 
semi-state, the PA lacks control over Palestinian resources which 
entails that the private and non-profit sector must shoulder some of 
the state’s responsibility by being responsive to the public. The public 
expects NGOs to address their service related worries, quality and 
quantity-wise, and contribute to infrastructure development. NGOs 
adopt a narrow perspective to service provision and a narrower one 
regarding NGOs role in political empowerment of the public or 
enhancing Palestinian national identity.  
None of the focus group participants or interviewees listed 
democracy, human rights, or gender as part of their immediate public 
needs or concerns. Few members of Board of Director (BoD) stated 
that people are more concerned with a ‘free ride’ rather than the 
general public interests because NGOs are seen as sources of free 
assistance and humanitarian relief (BA., KH., and JI., interview, 10 
May). One BoD member pointed out that: “It is the rich rather than 
the poor who always seek NGOs assistance. About 60-65% of food 
rations recipients are rich. People not needing food aid complain to 
us that they are not treated equally with those benefiting from food 
baskets” (JI., interview, 10 May). 
 
This is one factor behind the ‘charity mentality’ or ‘begging culture’ 
in the oPt which is blamed for the decline of voluntary work and 
community spirit among the public and NGOs’ activities and 
strategic thinking. 
Previous researches states that NGOs emphasize relief, health and 
education while very few work with communities negatively impacted 
by the Separation Wall (HA., interview, 10 February; HE., interview, 
2 February; M.B., interview, 30 March). Similarly, Table (6.1) below 
shows that 18% of surveyed staff and 37% of top management 
believe that NGOs benefits the poor compared to 15% and 52% who 
believed that this work is beneficial to the general public.  
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Mgt Staff  Mgt Staff Mgt Staff  
NGOs work is 
beneficial to the 
public  
37.5% 85% 25 % 15% 27.5% 0% 
The Poor benefit from 
NGOs work  
62.5% 82% 17.5% 18% 20% 0% 
NGOs enhance the 
quality of public life 
52.5% 84% 25% 15% 22.5% 1% 
NGOs contribute to 





2.6 % 0% 
NGOs contribute to 
human rights 
promotion  
55% 78% 30% 20% 15% 2% 
NGOs effort to 
promote democracy 
47.5% 59% 35% 39% 17.5% 2% 
 Sample size: 40 Top Mgt. and 100 staff. On a scale from 1- 5: very 
weak (1), weak (2), satisfactory (3), good (4), and very good (5). The 
scale is regrouped to indicating weak (1-2), satisfactory (3) and good 
(4-5). 
 
The above figures also indicate that NGOs are more active in human 
rights and democracy than in other fields. About 31% of staff and 
52% of management stated that NGOs contribute positively to the 
promotion of human rights and democracy. NGOs seem to work 
within scope of international organizations and donors and bring to 
their areas what the donors allow them to offer.  
 
NGOs Relationship with Stakeholders  
Politics and money are the most important factors defining the 
NGOs relationship with their stakeholders. Soliciting external 
funding is not a new industry among Palestinian NGOs (TB., 
interviews, 20 February; M.B., interview, 30 March). For decades, 
PLO paid Palestinian universities student tuitions and staff salaries 
and allocated budgets to political factions and sometimes NGOs 
working inside the Occupied Territories. The NGOs had followed 
PLO political agendas as long as PLO remained influential and 








Today, the relationship between NGOs and stakeholders follow a 
similar pattern. The organizational and staff surveys in table 6.2 show 
that the highest mean, i.e. better relationship, exists between the 
NGOs and political parties. On scale of 1-5, both managers and staff 
have the highest response mean of 3.38 and 2.9 respectively. The 
second highest mean (i.e. best performance) is found in the current 
monitoring by the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) and cooperation 
with local government where scores ranged between 2.83 and 2.96. 
The lowest mean (i.e. worst performance) is indicated in monitoring 
of NGOs activities by line ministries, which is the role usurped by the 
MoI.  
 





Management Staff Mean 
Weak Satisfactory- 
very good  
Weak Satisfactory 
- very good  
Mgt Staff 
Monitoring by 
Ministry of Interior  
37.5% 62.5% 27.5% 72.5% 2.90 2.83 
Monitoring by line 
ministries 
53.8% 46.2% 63.0% 37.0% 2.36 1.93 
Cooperation with 
NGOs (sector) 
47.5% 52.5% 45.0% 55.0% 2.42 2.28 
Relationship with 
political parties 
48.7% 61.3% 50.0% 50.0% 3.38 2.97 
Cooperation with 
political parties 
57.9% 52.1% 62.6% 37.4% 2.32 2.53 
Cooperation with 
local government  
40.0% 60.0% 46.0% 54.0% 2.83 2.96 
Sample size included 40 Top Mgt. officials, and 100 staff members. 
On a scale of 1- 5: 1 represents very weak, 2 weak, 3 satisfactory, 4 
good, and 5 very good. The ranking is re-grouped to weak (1-2), 
satisfactory – very good (3-5). 
 
3.1. Relationship with the Palestinian Authority 
As said before, the MoI is the main PA agency with the mandate to 
regulate NGOs affairs, although technical supervision and licensing 
are assigned to other line ministries (social affairs, sport, women, 
education, youth, and agriculture). In fact, line ministries undertake 
the least of oversight as indicated by 54% of surveyed BoD members 
and 63% of NGOs staff who described this role as weak. In the table 
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below, the lowest score comes from service delivery organizations 
which ironically should be more subject to oversight by line ministries 
than advocacy NGOs or organizations with combined mandates.  




















NGO 6 5 6 17 9 7 0 16 
CBO 9 6 8 23 12 6 5 23 
Total 15 11 14 40 21 13 5 39 
Advocacy 4 1 3 8 6 2 0 8 
Services 9 8 7 24 11 8 5 24 
Both 2 2 4 8 4 3 0 7 
Total 15 11 14 40 21 13 5 39 
Sample size included 40 NGO Top Mgt. officials, 1 did not answer. 
 
Table 6.4 also shows that NGOs demand a larger role for line 
ministries. All NGOs managers responded with a preference for 
oversight by line ministries; more than 81% of surveyed staff who 
believed that the MoI should undertake a lesser supervisory role 
because two-thirds of staff members (63%) believe that the MOI’s 
oversight is rather weak.   
 
Table 4: NGOs Satisfaction of Monitoring by MoI and Line 
Ministers 







is done by line ministries  
Mgt. 53.8% 33.3% 12.9% 
Staff 63% 37% - 
NGOs monitoring/oversight 
is done by Ministry of 
Interior  
Mgt. 27.5% 35% 2.9 
Staff 63% 37% - 
NGOs monitoring/oversight 
should be done by line 
Ministries 
Mgt 0% 0% 100% 
Staff 2 % 17% 81% 
NGO monitoring/oversight 
should be done by the 
Ministry of Interior 
Mgt 17.5% 10% 72.5% 
Staff 27% 20% 53% 
Sample size included 40 NGO Top Mgt. officials, and 100 staff 
members. 
It is not be surprising that politically affiliated NGOs 








security forces except for Fateh- affiliated NGOs. The latter groups 
enjoy better relations with the MoI and other PA institutions and 
have wider margin for free speech and criticism of PA performance. 
Some MoI employees serve as BoD members of many NGOs 
(Kafreyat focus group, 19 March). The Beit Rima focus group also 
accused the PA of favouritism, politicization and discrimination in 
the registration. Furthermore, PA is alleged allocate disproportional 
funding to some NGOs from its budget and deliberately neglects to 
announce available fund to the NGO sector. The focus group 
reported on a case where the Prime Minister’s Office declined an 
NGO request for PA contribution to the renovation of a historical 
site (Beit Rima focus group, 4 April). Similarly, refugee communities 
accuse the PA of neglecting refugee camps and the right to return (El-
Amari focus group, 31 May). In another example, in 2009, during the 
Israeli war on Gaza, the PA forced NGOs to stop their fundraising 
campaigns because the money shall benefiting Gaza Strip under 
Hamas control (Beit Rima focus group, 4 April). Even cooperatives 
are now subjected to the same security clearance before registration 
after June 2007 because the PA does not want Hamas to function 
through cooperatives or NGOs in the West Bank. Therefore, some 
organizations keep their interaction with the PA to the minimum 
legal requirements such as registrations and financial reporting.  
3.2 Relationship with Political Factions 
The findings of both surveys show that NGOs relationships with 
political parties are not bad in general but NGOs sector calls for 
stronger relationships and coordination with political factions. This 
tendency is apparent among NGOs staff (90%) more than managers 
(55%) as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 5: Perceptions of Top Management and Staff of NGO 
Relations to Political Factions 
Statement Group Weak Satisfactory Good Mean 
NGOs current relationship 
with political parties is 
Mgt 48.7% 28.2 % 23  % 2.54 
Staff 50.0% 24% 26 % 2.90 
NGOs relationship with 
political parties should be 
Mgt 33.3% 12.8 % 53.8% 3.38 
Staff  19.2% 7.1% 73.8 % 3.91 
NGOs current cooperation 
with political parties is 
Mgt 57.9% 23.7 % 18.4% 2.32 
Staff  62.6% 11.1 % 26.2% 2.53 
NGOs cooperation with 
political parties should be 
Mgt 26.3% 18.4 % 55.2% 3.55 
Staff  8.10% 2.0% 89.9% 4.20 
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Moreover, the survey shows that men only and mixed-membership 
NGOs, along with organizations lacking strategic plans, want their 
relationships to be improved with political parties, while women’s 
organizations were more vocal against that. Small organizations 
operating with less than USD 100,000 scored the highest in terms of 
existing cooperation although they demand more cooperation. 
Moreover, it is noticeable that district level NGOs call for better 
relationship compared to NGOs working at the West Bank level. 
The data presented in table 6.6 shows some difference in NGOs 
outlook to political factions between various generations of NGOs. 
The surveyed NGOs and CBOs show fewer differences except that 
organizations working at the West Bank level are much more 
successful in such cooperation than their district or local 
counterparts. The table below also reveals that more than half of 
service delivery and advocacy organizations are not satisfied of their 
relationship with political parties. Interestingly, none of the pre-
Madrid generation indicated good relations with political factions, 
while almost one third of the post-Oslo generations said they do.  
Table 6: Relationships to Political Parties by Type of Organization 
Type 
Relationship with Political 
Parties 








NGO 7 5 4 16 8 4 3 15 
CBO 12 6 5 23 14 5 4 23 
Subtotal 19 11 9 39 22 9 7 38 
Advocacy 4 1 3 8 4 2 2 8 
Services 13 7 4 24 14 6 3 23 
Combined  2 3 2 7 4 1 2 7 
Subtotal 19 11 9 39 22 9 7 38 
Before 
1990 
6 3 0 9 7 1 0 8 
1990-2000 7 2 3 12 8 1 3 12 
2001-2010 6 6 6 18 7 7 4 18 
Subtotal 19 11 9 39 22 9 7 38 
West Bank 6 2 4 12 6 2 3 11 
District  4 4 2 10 6 2 2 10 
Local  9 5 3 17 10 5 2 17 








Sample size included 40 NGO Top Mgt., however, 1 did not answer 
relationship with political parties and 2 did not answer cooperation 
with political parties. 
 
However, NGOs-political factions relationships are complex in the 
oPt which sometimes leads to negative consequences on the non-
profit sector. The findings indicate that politically-affiliated NGOs are 
used for personal interests as well as for generating support during 
elections (SA., interview, 1 February) and for providing their 
members with free services (Kafreyat focus group, 19 March ) or as a 
substitute for national struggle (ER., interview, 15 December).  
Despite the fairly positive outlook, the interviews alluded to hidden 
conflicts between the BoDs and employees in politically affiliated 
NGOs. Disagreements revolved around whether the NGOs should 
adhere to professional criteria in the selection of employees and 
beneficiaries or work along the political party lines. For example, 
PARC2 resisted pressure from the People’s Party to hire its members 
as staff and the only beneficiaries of its programs (A.J., interview, 27 
March). The conflict sometime reflects the mutual distrust and 
personal rivalries between senior members of political parties serving 
as members of NGOs governing bodies and between NGO personnel 
receiving salaries from foreign donors (A.K., interview, 17 March).  
In an urban center, called BISAN Centre for Research & 
Development, the internal harmony inside the BoD and GA is 
guaranteed by recruiting all members from supporters and friends of 
the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). One GA 
member and a close friend of the former General Manager, and who 
is not a PFLP supporter, stopped attending GA meetings (KB., 
interview, 15 March). BISAN works in line with the PFLP vision (JA., 
interview, 31 March), but the NGO “does not allow PFLP to interfere 
in its management” (KB., interview, 15 March) although it is not 
apparent how this can be done when BoD and staff members are all 
PFLP supporters. The interviewees further explained that all political 
                                                          
2
 PARC was created by the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) in 1980 as a union 
from several grassroots (A.K., interview, 17 March 2011). Now it is the biggest 
organization in the West Bank working with women, youth and farmers to protect 
Palestinian land from confiscation and other occupation measures.  
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factions, not only the left-leaning ones, use this tactic of creating 
many linkages among community, NGOs, and political party 
members (Kafreyat focus group, 19 March). Some cooperate with 
other community organizations and cooperatives of different political 
affiliations (Beita case study, 10 May). In extreme cases, participation 
in CBO activities is conditioned by potential beneficiaries’ acceptance 
to apply for membership in the political faction.  
In refugee camps, PA and political factions do not interfere in CBOs 
affairs except during BoDs elections because the camps’ Popular 
Committees are actually in charge of all affairs 3 . UNRWA is the 
major player in service delivery and refugee protection in the camps. 
Sometimes, UNRWA provides camp-based CBOs some of the funds 
solicited in the name of Palestinian refugees (El-Amari focus group, 
31 May) in the form of project grants. CBOs report directly to 
UNRWA offices through a computerized system where project-
related information on funds, activities, beneficiaries’ names are 
entered and stored (MS., interview, 12 April). UNRWA funds small 
projects and activities that are repetitive and conventional in scope. 
The refugee population would rather see UNRWA’s funding spent 
on women’s education and economic production projects rather than 
on celebrating women’s day and other international occasions (El-
Amari focus group, 31 May). 
 
3.3 Relationship with Local Government 
The results of both surveys indicate that NGOs-local government 
cooperation ranges between weak to satisfactory, irrespective of the 
type of organization and locality. About 40% to 46% of respondents 
were less than satisfied with the current relationship. The two groups 
disagreed on qualifying the exact relationships whether as more than 
satisfactory as reported by 60% of NGO managers, or just 
satisfactory, as indicated by 54% of staff. None of the staff surveyed 
said the relationship with local government is actually as good as it 
should be.  
 
                                                          
3
 Refugee Camps’ Popular Committees are PLO structures funded through the PA 








Table 7: Respondents Perceptions of Current NGO-Local 
Government Relationship 
Group 









40 40 % 37.5% 22.5 2.83% 
Staff 100 46 % 54 % 0% 2.96% 
 
Interviews with members in CBOs and local councils’4 indicate that 
municipalities and local councils depend on external funding in the 
same manner as NGOs. The majority of local CBOs require 
facilitation, authorization and financial support from their local 
councils in order to operate successfully. Nevertheless, about 40% of 
the sample described their relationship with local governance as weak 
even though it is expected to be stronger with official institutions at 
the local level. Compared to village councils, municipalities are 
richer, stronger and exercise more power over NGOs and CBOs 
working within their boundaries (R.El-T., interview, 12 January; M.El-
R., interview, 4 April). Often times municipalities are cooperative and 
allow local CBOs to take part in needs assessments and strategic 
planning (R.El-T., interview, 12 January), and sometime they 
completely disregard local CBOs.  
Table 8: NGO-Local Government Relations by Type of 
Organizations 
Type 








NGO 6 6 5 17 1 7 9 17 
CBO 10 9 4 23 0 5 18 23 
Subtotal 16 15 9 40 1 12 27 40 
Advocacy 3 3 2 8 0 4 4 8 
Services 9 10 5 24 0 6 18 24 
Both 4 2 2 8 1 2 5 8 
Subtotal 16 15 9 40 1 12 27 40 
                                                          
4
 Palestinian local ‘governments’ or local councils units are include 
municipalities, villages, project committees and joint service councils. The first 
two are directly elected administrative units that lack legislative powers or 
mandate for collection of major taxes. They are financially independent but 
receive assistance from the PA ‘government’.  
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It is generally service delivery organizations that are more satisfied 
with the local governments because the latter are more accepting of 
local organizations when they provide social or economic services. 
Such organizations are perceived as less political but important 
institutions filling in the gaps in PA services at the local level. 
 
3.4 Relationship within the NGO Sector  
The NGO literature is not the only source of information on NGOs 
lack of coordination and vision. The interviews revealed a total 
agreement on this statement among the surveyed managers and staff 
as well as among the interviewees. In general, NGO staff is inclined 
to describe this relationship as good (29 %) more than managers 
(7.5%). Those in top management are more satisfied with the 
coordination among NGOs as expressed by 45% of this group. 
 
Table 9: Respondents’ Satisfaction of Coordination in NGO Sector  
Group Sample Weak Satisfactory Good 
Top Management 40 47.5% 45 % 7.5% 
Staff 100 45 % 26 % 29% 
 
Moreover, Table 6.10 below depicts a satisfaction rate lower than 
50% in both NGOs and CBOs. The least satisfied are the mixed- 
gender membership service delivery organizations belonging to the 
older generation of NGOs. This is somehow expected because this 
generation was created under occupation therefore is highly political 
and more competitive with the PA and newer NGOs.  
 
Table 10: Respondents’ Perceptions of NGOs Coordination by 
Type of Organization 
Type of organization 
Current Coordination 
Weak  Satisfactory  Good  Total  
NGO 8 8 1 17 
CBO 11 10 2 23 
Subtotal 19 18 3 40 
advocacy  3 5 0 8 
Services 11 11 2 24 
Both 5 2 1 8 








Women 4 3 1 8 
Mixed 12 13 2 27 
Men 3 2 0 5 
Subtotal 19 18 3 40 
Coalitions  15 10 2 27 
Non-coalition  4 8 1 13 
Subtotal  19 18 3 40 
Pre-1990 6 3 0 9 
1990-2000 7 5 1 13 
2001-2010 6 10 2 18 
Subtotal 19 18 3 40 
 
Advocacy organizations however coordinate less frequently although 
advocacy requires networking and collective efforts to produce 
tangible results. The Pre-Madrid generation and men–only 
organizations showed the lowest mean score of 1.89. However, most 
optimistic responses came from the newest mixed- gender 
membership NGOs working throughout the West Bank with a 
medium budget of US$ 100,000 -500,000 yet without strategic 
planning.  
The sample organizations also pointed out to low cooperation among 
local CBOs, often times restricted to the implementation of specific 
projects only when joint activities are built-in project plans (focus 
group results). However, NGO-CBO coordination depends on their 
political affiliations and personal relationship. For example, 
“cooperatives have absolute support and funding from PARC, so 
farmers groups do not work with other organizations” (Beit Rima 
focus group, 4 April).  
It is evident then that money and politics shape NGOs relationship 
with their stakeholders. Coordination is lacking within the NGOs 
community itself while NGO-donor relationship is the strongest. 
NGOs relationship with political parties and local governments 
ranges from weak to satisfactory depending on the NGO size and 
mandate. However, small CBOs need official support from local 
councils to access funding or implement joint projects while large 
NGOs can do without municipal support. Nevertheless NGOs-PA 
relationship remains the most contentious so that NGOs comply 
with the legal minimums but secretly wish for a transfer of NGOs 
oversight from the MoI to line ministries.  
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4. NGOs Accountabilities  
Some researchers believe that the NGO community in general lacks 
internal and external accountability. NGOs internal governance 
structures are also weak which poses serious challenges to civil society 
around the world. This is particularly true for the Palestinian society 
as it has grown rapidly in volume after Oslo Accords (Kim, 2003), 
and in reliance on foreign donations (DeVoir & Tartir, 2009). Given 
the size of the civil society sector in the oPt, the demise of Palestinian 
NGOs is understandably predictable in case foreign aid dries up 
without any other alternative source of support to NGOs.  
Researchers focus more on examining the nature of donor-NGO 
relationship; and NGOs accountability to donors. However, there is a 
limited focus on NGOs accountability towards the public (Kilby, 
2004). Literature also has examined NGOs accountability towards the 
government, (i.e. the PA in the West Bank), from a strictly 
management point of view (Al-Moaqat, 2007) neglecting that it is 
equally important to investigate accountability not only as a 
mechanism or a tool, but also as a reflection of decision–making 
processes that must be considered in all policy-making phases up to 
implementation stage (Abdalhadi, 2004; Jad, 2003, Samara, 2001). 
However, few or no studies have explored public accountability in 
terms of NGOs adherence to the Palestinian national goals. 
The next sections investigate the stakeholders that NGO should be, 
in theory and practice, accountable to and explore sources and types 
of accountability with each stakeholder. The section looks at the issue 
of ‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’, mistakenly construed by NGOs as a 
synonym of ‘accountability-free’ or as a justification to intentionally 
reduce or evade their accountability obligations towards its 
stakeholders. In the case of Palestinian NGOs, organizational 
independence is a contested concept simply because NGOs 
accountability and autonomy are not mutually exclusive. The NGO 
autonomy status endowed by the law refers only to ‘interference from 
public authorities in NGOs affairs’ rather than relieving NGOs of all 
sorts of accountability obligations. The section further explores 
whether the civil society sector needs a unified model of 








term, (b) the impact of NGOs dependence on foreign funding seen as 
a major obstacle for them to enhance their accountability to the 
public in particular.  
 
4.1. Definition, Source and Forms of NGO Accountability 
Accountability is a relatively new term with multiple facets and 
aspects particularly when applied to the third sector. The concept 
denotes both ethics and governance but there are a number of 
definitions in circulation, each highlighting one or more of its 
aspects.  
The term ‘accountability’ indicates ‘‘the means by which individuals 
and organizations report to a recognized authority or authorities, and 
are held responsible for their actions” (Fox & Brown cited in 
Ebrahim, 2003, p. 813). In this definition, the principle of 
accountability is simplified to denote transparency and the right to 
access information. Accountability is also defined as a ‘‘process of 
holding actors responsible for their actions” (Fox & Brown, cited in 
Ebrahim, 2003, p. 814) and about “being ‘held responsible’ by others 
and ‘taking responsibility’ for oneself” (Cornwall et al. cited in 
Ebrahim, 2003, p. 814). 
It is difficult to ignore the vagueness and the legalistic nature of the 
last two definitions. The Palestinian law of 2000 echoes some of the 
legal focus in its emphasis of the NGO’s internal structure, e.g. NGO 
founding committee, GA, and BoD, while not holding NGO leaders 
responsible before the law (Al-Moaqat, 2007). Although the above 
definitions of accountability are limited to legal aspects and 
mechanisms of reporting to authorities, other definitions reduce the 
concept even further to cover only NGOs finances. It is noticeable 
that the literature disagrees on the scope of NGOs accountability 
except with regard to the financial performance which ultimately 
means “how NGOs spend their money” (Tandon, n.d.). Despite such 
narrow scopes, accountability still brings important value 
connotations as a ‘moral principle’ (Gray et al., 2006) that cannot be 
overlooked while discussing NGOs accountability in relation to 
national goals.  
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4.2. External Accountability  
Each organization is theoretically accountable to multiple 
stakeholders 5  that enjoy certain rights and powers over the 
organization’s existence and operation. There are two distinct major 
stakeholder groups to analyze in terms of their relationships to an 
NGO. 
NGOs external stakeholders are usually the following entities:  
a- NGO service users / target groups 
b- NGO community / local community and their components  
c- Public authority (e.g. PA) 
d- Donors /financial supporters  
It is argued that with the above external groups, there are formal 
systems of NGO accountability involving formal tools. According to 
Ebrahim: 
There are five broad mechanisms of accountability: reports and 
disclosure statements, performance assessments and evaluations, participation, 
self-regulation, and social audit. Each mechanism, distinguished as either 
a ‘tool’ or a ‘process,’ is analyzed along three dimensions of 
accountability: upward–downward, internal–external, and 
functional–strategic. It is observed that accountability in practice has 
emphasized ‘upward’ and ‘external’ accountability to donors while 
‘downward’ and ‘internal’ mechanisms remain comparatively 
underdeveloped. Moreover, NGOs and funders have focused 
primarily on short-term ‘functional’ accountability responses at the 
expense of longer-term ‘strategic’ processes necessary for lasting social 
and political change. Key policy implications for NGOs and donors 
are discussed (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 1). 
 
However, because NGOs are non-profit seeking yet with structures 
close to private firms, ‘accountability’ has accounting implications 
                                                          
5
 Stakeholders are not necessarily in sync with one another but may diverge 
substantially in terms of goals, agendas and relationships to one another. Based on 
liberal management, there is a premise that conflicts among stakeholders exist but 
somehow can be resolved. The business school of management suggests that 
stakeholders can be conflicting but there is a possibility to reach a certain (win-








much like the business sector itself (Fries cited in Gray et al., 2006), 
the concept carries two implications on the NGOs: 
First, individuals in control of NGO funds (managers and donors) 
may well be quite distinct from those who receive/benefit from the 
service (clients or beneficiaries). Typically, there is no direct means by 
which beneficiaries can enforce accountability upon donors and 
managers especially when the NGO is not a membership-based 
organization.  
Second, as not-for-profit, NGOs have no simple system of 
performance equivalent to the profit/loss measure used in private 
sector. In profit-oriented organizations, financial analysis and 
measurement refer to financial statements and dominate all 
assessments of organizational performance and accountability. While 
the measurement argument is true, it is possible to define few 
mechanisms (e.g. those identified by Ebrahim above) through which 
accountability to stakeholders can be enhanced. 
 
4.3. Accountability Dilemma in Palestinian Context 
Before embarking on a detailed discussion of the study’s 
accountability findings, I shall present the next table which provides a 
snapshot of the prevailing NGOs perceptions towards their 
stakeholders. On a scale of (1) to (7), 1 being the lowest, table 6.12 
presents respondents’ ranking of the importance of stakeholders to 
their own organizations and the entire NGO sector. The table 
collapse responses given by the surveyed NGOs management and 
staff in order to show the differences in their outlook. The study 
assumption is that managers are more likely to play it safe and reflect 
the optimal rather than the actual practices. Compared to their staff, 
mangers would be more concerned with showing least attachment to 
donors and a higher level of adherence to national goals.  
 
Table 6.11: Accountability in own NGOs Vs. NGO Sector, by 
Order of Importance  
NGO Accountability 







Towards the Palestinian 
public & local communities  
1 2 2 
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Towards the Palestinian 
national goals  
2 3 3 
Towards NGO board of 
directors 
3 NA NA 
Towards the Palestinian 
Authority  
4 4 4 
Towards the NGO donors 5 1 1 
Towards the NGO sector 6 NA NA 
Towards the political 
parties/ factions 
7 NA NA 
Towards Palestinian future 
generations  
NA 5 5 
NA indicates that this question was not directed to that group. 1 
indicates the most important stakeholder while 7 the less important.  
Out of 40 Top Mgt. official 37 and 100 staff answered to the 
question about their own organizations. 
 
The above table confirms many of the study’s initial assumptions. 
Managers stated that their utmost priority is being accountable to the 
public and Palestinian communities. Their staffs completely disagree: 
their first accountability is in fact directed to their own donors, much 
like all other organizations, followed by accountability to the public. 
Both groups ranked the PA as the fourth important stakeholder that 
NGOs are accountable to while accountability to political factions is 
seen as the least important by the NGOs management unlike the staff 
who said NGOs are least accountable to Palestinian future 
generations.  
In reality, Palestinian NGOs perception of accountability is 
influenced by the ‘reporting to donor mentality’ and by their 
relationship to their ‘beneficiaries-clients’. Given the NGOs lack of 
community identity, it is harder to ensure their accountability to the 
Palestinian society since they are seen as being ‘hijacked’ by donors’ 
agendas and funding used to further individual interests. Therefore, 
they only hold themselves accountable to no other stakeholder but 
the most essential and powerful of all: their donors. 
 
4.4. Mentality of Accountability 
NGOs model of interaction with the recipients of their services can 








found between a service provider and user. In reality, NGOs service 
users do not even rise to the client status per se. Obviously, this 
constitutes an important element of the NGOs accountability 
dilemma, especially towards the public. The mainstream model can 
be summarized as follows: NGO’s role is to solicit donor funds then 
provide services to the public freely or at a reduced cost than 
provided by the private sector. The public is therefore relegated to the 
status of passive ‘recipients’, ‘service users’ who should be thankful to 
the NGO’s generosity but have no rights to exercise over the services 
delivered to them, question their relevance or planning or even 
monitor the quality and process of their delivery. In the NGO’s 
mind, the service provider has the ‘upper hand’, compared to the 
powerless citizens (DW., interview, 22 April). 
Because of the aforementioned mentality, NGOs prepare and address 
their reports to other audience rather than the service users. Almost 
always written in foreign languages, NGO reports provide donors 
with as much details demanded by them. Major publications and 
media stories are also done in the same manner. Compared to their 
interaction with the public, the research community, or even their 
own BoD and GA members, NGO officials designate far more time 
and effort to meet their funders. Unlike donors, researchers and GA 
members struggle to gain access to NGO information (MD., 
interview, 16 March). 
The widespread reporting mentality entails that NGOs practice one-
way accountability which in turn highlights the power relationship 
between an NGO and its various stakeholders. NGOs are more likely 
to cooperate with parties that have power over them, be it financial or 
regulatory, impossible for the NGO to escape. If left to their own 
choosing, NGOs seem unwilling to report to any stakeholder unless 
there is a reason that tips the balance in favour of this or that 
stakeholder (MD., interview, 16 March). 
NGOs face challenges at the very heart of their existence: their 
representation of the social groups, issues and needs. In the public 
eye, NGOs collectively are seen as bogged down with immoral, illegal 
and essentially corrupt practices. NGOs choice is akin to voluntary 
blindness and the ensuing confusion regarding NGO accountability, 
legitimacy, and independence. 
Vol. 5 No. 2 




Palestinian NGOs frequently claim they enjoy relative independence 
in managing their activities and projects (Bargouthi cited in Hilal, 
2006). It is doubtful, however, that this is the case. In reality, some 
NGOs are affiliated to PA or political parties that manipulate their 
activities to benefit such affiliations. Moreover, donors’ interference 
is visible in dictating NGOs agendas, programs, and projects in their 
implementation. Donors attach a long list of political conditionality 
prior to and during receipt of funding (AMAN, 2009). In addition, 
donors and the PA are encouraged the formation of certain types of 
NGOs to operate mainly in the West Bank (Bargouthi cited in 
Daifallah, 2006; Abu El-Zolf in PJW, 2008; HI., interview, 9 April; 
A.K., interview, 17 March). This begs a question with regard to the 
source of the NGO legitimacy should be solely bestowed by the 
grassroots and the Palestinian public (Awashra, 2011).  
Finally, one observation needs to be made with regard to internal 
accountability, since the majority of experienced and influential 
Palestinian NGOs with political affiliations. This sounds like a 
legitimate consideration given the fact that the NGO law is silent on 
the accountability of mass arms of political parties although they are 
also registered as non-profit organizations under the same law. There 
is a dearth of information with regard to this important group of 
organizations that are undoubtedly influential at the local and 
national levels but they march to a different tune than the non-
politically affiliated sisters.  
 
4.5. Accountability to the Palestinian Public  
Legal and the idealistic views of community action presuppose that 
NGOs exist to serve the public good (Najim, 1996;  Muhsin, 2006 ) 
despite the awareness of NGOs seeking narrow, individual interests 
more than political parties. Self-serving as they are, they are bound to 
adopt up-ward accountability models particularly towards donors not 
the public (Bobbio cited in Bishara, 1996). As indicated in table 6.13, 
half of the NGOs Top. Mgt. officials (55%) surveyed assigned the 
highest accountability to the public then to the local community 
through incorporation of community needs in NGOs programs 








NGO transparency and access to information (47.5%) while public 
participation in decision making comes in the last place with (22.5%). 
  
Table 12: Perceptions Top Mgt. and Staff about NGO 
Accountability to the Public 
Statement Group Weak Satisfactory  Good 
Inclusion of public needs in 
NGOs projects  
Mgt  47.5% 42.5% 10% 
Staff  72% 22% 6% 
Public participation in 
NGOs decision making  
Mgt 77.5% 17.5% 5% 
Staff  99% 1% 0% 
NGOs accountability to 
public/local community  
Mgt 45% 35% 20% 
Staff  25% 73% 2% 
Public access to NGO 
information from  
Mgt  52.5% 27.5% 20% 
Staff  58% 40% 2% 
NGOs transparency Mgt 52.5% 30% 17.5% 
Staff  48% 50% 2% 
 
Overall, the combined percentages of satisfactory and good 
performance are very close in both respondent groups. Both agreed 
that the weakest of NGO performance occurs in participatory 
decision-making (77.5% of managers and 99% of staff) and in NGOs 
incorporation of public needs in NGO projects (47.5 of manager and 
72% of staff) transparency (52.55 of managers and 48% of staff) and 
public access to NGO information (52.5% of managers and 58% of 
staff). This has much to do with change in NGOs goals and programs 
to fit more with donors’ agendas. NGOs usually allow or tolerate 
some public participation lending even more support to the 
accusation of NGOs being strategically more accountable to donors 
than to local communities themselves (Najim, 1996, p. 351). 
In other words, NGO staffs are less satisfied than their managers of 
NGO accountability in almost all the statements. In contrast, very few 
staff believe that their organizations are doing a stellar job so that 
only 2-20% describes the performance of their NGOs as ‘good’ on 
almost all aspect of accountability. As indicated in table 6.14 NGO 
managers are also more convinced than CBO managers of their 
accountability. They are either more hesitant to admit the low 
accountability levels or do not wish for the enforcement of any more 
accountability.  
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Table 6.13: Perception of Top. Mgt. official of NGOs 






Weak  %  
Satisfactor
y–good % 
NGO 17 5 29.41% 12 70.59% 
CBO 23 13 56.52% 10 43.48% 
Subtotal 40 18 45 % 22 55% 
Advocacy  8 3 37.5% 5 62.5% 
Services 24 12 50% 12 50% 
Both 8 3 37.5% 5 62.5% 
Subtotal 40 18 45% 22 55% 
Women 8 5 62.5% 3 37.5% 
Mixed 27 10 37.04% 17 62.96 
Men 5 3 60% 2 40% 
Subtotal 40 18 45% 22 55% 
< US$ 100,000 17 10 58.82% 7 41.18% 
100-500,000 9 4 44.44% 5 55.56% 
> 0.5 million 7 2 28.57% 5 71.43% 
Subtotal 33 16  17  
Strategic plans 17 7 41.20% 10 58.80% 
No strategic plans 23 11 47.82% 12 52.18% 
Subtotal  40 18  22  
West Bank 13 4 30.76% 9 69.24% 
District  10 3 30% 7 70% 
Local  17 11 64.7% 6 35.3% 
Subtotal  40 18 45% 22 55% 
 
Furthermore, table 6.14 indicates that respondents from Oslo 
generation and service provision organizations feel that NGOs show 
weak accountability to the public more than the newer generations 
created during the past 20 years. About two thirds of managers of 
advocacy and mixed gender membership NGOs believe their 
organizations have satisfactory or good accountability practices. In 
addition, managers of small, locally-based organizations operating on 
an annual budget of less than USD 100,000 provided the argent 
percentage of ‘weak’ responses indicating there are least convinced of 
the overall level of NGO accountability to the public.  
With regard to information dissemination, the study found some 
NGOs and fewer CBOs in the sample operating websites but limit 








projects and occasionally organizational structures. Only 5 out of 20 
organizations publish brief financial statements with disclosing any 
detail on for example the salaries as a percentage of the NGOs 
operational costs, especially the remuneration of the top 
management6. Both public and PA believe that NGO staff receive 
high salaries and several proposed suggested the promulgation of 
NGO bylaw or act similar to the civil service law to delineate NGOs 
salary scales and remuneration systems (RN., interview, 25 April). 
Furthermore, it is customary for NGOs to upload their publicity 
materials and sometime annual reports intended for publication; 
while solid information such as needs assessment, strategic plans, 
project documents and evaluation reports are kept confidential and 
can only be accessed upon request by those with the right personal 
connections (e.g. researchers). 
The public seem to have less access to NGOs information than to 
CBOs despite the availability of knowhow and information 
dissemination methods in the NGOs. Table 6.15 indicates that this 
level of secrecy seems to be practiced by the older, pre-Oslo 
generation of politically-affiliated mass organizations while the 1990s 
generation is doing relatively a better job. This might be explained by 
the donors’ visibility obligations and funding conditions that can 
make information dissemination a must or leave it to the discretion 
of the NGO itself.  
 
Table 14: Public Access to NGO information 
                                                          
6
 One NGO manager I interviewed suggested that organizations should disclose 
their detailed financial data to enhance their accountability and transparency. 
However the same interviewee refused to provide the researcher with the 
requested financial information. 
Type Weak Satisfactory Good Total  
NGO 10 3 4 17 
CBO 11 8 4 23 
Subtotal 21 11 8 40 
Before 1990 3 5 1 9 
1991-2000 8 0 5 13 
2001-2010 10 6 2 18 
Subtotal 21 11 8 40 
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In the case of CBOs in villages and refugee camps, it is more likely 
that the organization’s staff, general assembly and BoD members 
come from the same local community, which translates into direct 
interaction with the public. The fact that local communities are small 
in size and have closely-knit social relationships so people are likely to 
know each other guarantees a formal type of downward 
accountability particularly in terms of inclusion of local needs in 
CBO programs. For example, El-Amari Women’s Centre works on 
poverty reduction, income-generation, vocational training and 
political empowerment of residents, particularly among women in 
addition to promoting refugees’ right to return among Palestinian 
communities, donor agencies and diplomatic missions (El-Amari 
focus group, 31 May).  
NGOs in major cities come at the other end of accountability 
spectrum, raising people’s doubt and criticism for their “fancy offices, 
cars, inflated salaries and foreign funding” (SM., interview, 18 
December 2010). Think-tanks, advocacy, women and youth NGOs 
are singled out for criticism more than charitable societies and CBOs 
operating with local funds. This may explain partly why the grassroots 
and CBO are seen more accountable to the public while foreign 
funding may increase the scope of service provided, they have the 
downside of raising questions about their accountability to donors on 
the account of accountability to the local communities and the public 
in general (Hulme & Edwards cited in Kamat, 2004).  
 
4.6 Accountability to Palestinian Authority 
According to table 6.16, 80% of NGO staff surveyed and 48% of the 
top management feel that NGOs accountability to the PA is weak. 
Could it be a case of NGOs trying to pretend to be less submissive to 
the PA7 than they actually are or would it entail a different form of 
accountability that NGOs need to practice vis-à-vis the PA? This has 
to be seen!  
                                                          
7
 A public survey conducted by AMAN in 2005 found that the Palestinian public 
believe that ‘the PA government should fulfil its accountability roles’. About 61% 
of West Bank respondents and 65% in the Gaza Strip said that the PA is not doing 








Table 15: Respondents’ Perceptions of NGOs Accountability to the 
PA 
Group Weak Satisfactory Good 
Top Management 47.5% 32.5% 20 
Staff  80 20 0% 
 
Upon closer look, the data in both surveys suggests that the new 
generation of organizations are more accountable to the PA, probably 
due to their relative nascence as they were born after the passage of 
Law No (1) of 2000 and during an era that engulfed the non-profit in 
many battles with the PA and de facto Hamas authority in the Gaza 
Strip.  
 
Table 16: Top Managers’ Perceptions of NGOs Accountability to 
the PA 
Type Weak  Satisfactory  Good  Total 
Before 1990 5 2 2 9 
1991-2000 7 3 3 13 
2001-2010 7 8 3 18 
Subtotal 19 13 8 40 
NGO 8 5 4 17 
CBO 11 8 4 23 
Subtotal 19 13 8 40 
Advocacy  2 4 2 8 
Services 11 8 5 24 
Both 6 1 1 8 
Subtotal 19 13 8 40 
 
One way of accountability to the PA can be found in the extent of 
NGOs participation in PA planning and adherence to the national 
plans in their programs. During the interviews, it became clear that 
NGOs are unaware of PA plans 8 , lack interest in their 
                                                          
8
 For example, the director of a national agricultural NGO is unaware of the 
national plans developed for the sector by the Ministry of Agriculture. Almost 
every PA ministry has its five-year strategic plans, and sometime there are cross-
sectoral plans such as the cross-sectoral plan for local governance developed in 
2010 through USAID support in participation with the ministries of Finance, 
Education, Health, Public Works, industry, Economy and Planning and in addition 
to Water, Environment and Energy Authorities and the Association of Palestinian 
Local Authorities (APLA). The Ministry of Planning routinely develops short 
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implementation or disagree with the PA in their directions and 
technical content (El-Z., interview, 17 January; HA., 10 February). 
Working within the framework of PA priorities can also indicate loss 
of NGO freedom and independence or that gearing NGOs activities 
towards supporting the interest of the ruling party (i.e Fateh 
movement) (ZY., interview, 10 March; RN., interview, 25 April; A.J., 
interview, 27 March). To some organizations, PA plans offer NGOs 
potential funding opportunities from donor agencies involved in PA 
planning (KB., interview, 15 March). Instead of adopting a follower 
stance, as the PA prefers, NGO leaders ask for full and equal 
partnership with the PA and have a real say in the decision-making 
over PA planning and the national and sectoral levels (ZN., interview, 
15 February; KH., interview, 26 April). Other NGOs, such as the 
Welfare Association, do not oppose nor follow PA planning but 
target sectors that not covered by the PA and major donors (DW., 
interview, 22 April). On the other hand, the PA shares the popular 
view that urban NGOs, mainly those with left orientations, are 
essentially accountable to their political factions (RN., interview, 25 
April) and donors (ZEY., interview, 3 March) and insensitive to 
public needs (FRE., interview, 30 April). Some PA officers think 
NGOs serve donors’ agendas and secretly strive to weaken the PA and 
are awaiting the opportunity to take over in due time (ZEY., 
interview, 3 March).  
 
4.7 Accountability to the NGO Sector 
Unsurprisingly, the study findings show NGOs accountability to the 
NGO sector is also weak, occupying the second lowest place after 
accountability to political parties. Some interviewees explained this 
weakness by the absence of a unified vision, competition over 
funding, political disagreements among NGO leaders, and a generally 
non-existent collaboration unless warranted by a common interest. 
Competition over NGO funding weakens their collective 
accountability and caused conflicts that damaged the reputation of 
the non-profit sector before donors and the public (T.NA., 
                                                                                                                                    
term and long term planning ranging between 3-15 years, with support from the 
World Bank or other agencies such as the UNICEF that backs up the national 








conversation, 22 February; SA., interview, 1 February, A.K., interview, 
17 March).  
At the other end, organizations rarely adopt a unified approach or 
position to NGO affairs unless promoted by an immediate goal or 
sense of solidarity against measures undertaken by the PA or security 
forces. Currently umbrella associations and unions seldom do 
anything to enhance the sector’s accountability to the public or at 
least to the non-profit sector. PNGO, the most expansive of network, 
has long fallen victim to political rivalries between factions that 
severely hindered its ability to function as a real umbrella or platform 
(HA., interview, 10 February;  ET., interview, 15 March; A.J., 
interview, 27 March).  
On other occasions, relationships fluctuate between urban-based and 
local organizations depending on who needs whom or unless 
pressured by donors occasionally funding joint projects. In few cases, 
donors insisting on NGO-CBO cooperation or design program based 
on NGO-CBO partnership so that the NGOs can meet donors’ 
requirements and “mentor’ CBOs to develop their institutional 
capacities and systems (e.g. planning, recruitment, procurement, 
accounting, etc.) in parallel with activity implementation so that the 
CBO systems become more in line with their contractual obligations 
with the donor (ER., interview, 15 December). 
 
4.8. NGOs Accountability to Political Parties 
At first, I hesitated to include any questions on political parties in the 
surveys, preferring to discuss any pertinent issue directly with the 
interviewees. The piloting showed that these questions can be directly 
addressed to the survey respondents. The findings indicate that 
NGOs accountability towards political factions is not only weak but 
in fact the weakest of all NGO accountability to all stakeholders. In 
fact managers gave the political parties the seventh and lowest place 
in terms of importance as a stakeholder they should be accountable 
to (see table 6.12). Moreover, only 37.4% of staff stated that their 
relationships with political parties are satisfactory or good compared 
to 52% of surveyed managers (see table 6.2).  
In the survey, few NGOs stated that ‘NGOs refrain from engagement 
in politics or adopting a political agenda’ as one of the sector’s 
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priorities (see table 5.19). The NGOs are split on this issue. On one 
hand, one view believes that while NGOs should not be accountable 
to political parties and factions, yet it is possible for NGOs to work 
along a political or factional vision without being involved directly in 
politics or allowing factional interests to infringe on their 
management. Another view stresses the general feeling that “it is far 
better for the Palestinian public if NGOs are led by the political 
parties instead of being solely controlled by donors and the current 
NGO elites” (SAR., interview, 26 April). However, the last statement 
should not be seen a case of favouring political factions over NGOs 
but a matter of caution and a damage-control strategy opting for the 
selection of the least bad scenario (i.e. factions/parties vs. 
donors/elites). Even though, it is felt that for it would be highly 
critical to protect the NGOs from politics in order for the non-profit 
sector to become accountable to next generation and to national 
agenda (Shawa, 2000). 
 
4.9. NGOs Accountability to Donors 
Donors differ in the requirements they demand from their ‘partner’ 
organizations before and after a grant award is made. After the fund 
is offered, donors generally require periodic reporting, financial and 
narrative, visibility, separate bank account for the funded project and 
public acknowledgment of donor funding in newspaper, publicity 
materials and events. Foreign donors expect that NGOs and CBOs 
avoid using their funds to work against the interests of the Israeli 
occupation or not be involved in such activities at all.  
In the field, participants expressed various understandings of the 
issue of donors’ impact on Palestinian politics. At the national level, 
donors in various ways do influence the PA and its official 
institutions flowing down to local councils. Also national NGOs are 
more susceptible to donor influence but donor-funded projects’ 
themselves had no direct impact on the results of Palestinian national 
or local elections (Kafreyat focus group, 19 March). 
Generally, Palestinian NGOs are consistently accountable to their 
donors. Interviewees indicated that accountability to donors is 
strongest and more regular and approximately 70% of surveyed staff 








comparative percentages in table 6.18 show that CBOs are weaker 
than NGOs in being accountable to their donors, probably because 
CBOs have far few foreign donors in the first place and operate on a 
small scale that leave less opportunity for mismanagement. 
 
      Table 6.17: Perceptions of NGOs Accountability to Donors by 
Surveyed Group 
Group Weak Satisfactory Good 
Top management 30% 25% 45% 
Staff  26.3% 12.1% 61.6% 
 
While the percentages do not indicate a significant difference 
between the groups, the results become apparent when the results are 
cross-tabulated with the other six organizational types. In terms of 
NGO generation, the pre-Oslo organizations are more satisfied with 
their accountably to donor, e.g. political factions, PLO support, 
European solidarity funds, etc., although it is not clear how these 
donors enforce such accountability because of the overtly political 
nature of these generation of oPt organizations. By comparison, 
advocacy organizations are believed to be more adhering to donor 
accountability than their service delivery or combined-mandate 
sisters. Probably this is directly related to the availability of systems, 
funding and other capacities within the advocacy subsector compared 
to the other organizations. 
 
Table 6.18: Perceptions of NGOs Accountability to Donors by 
Type of Organization 
Type Weak Satisfactory Good Total 
NGO 2 2 13 17 
CBO 10 8 5 23 
Subtotal 12 10 18 40 
Before 1990 2 2 5 9 
1991-2000 3 2 8 13 
2001-2010 7 6 5 18 
Subtotal 12 10 18 40 
Advocacy 1 1 6 8 
Services 9 8 7 24 
Combined 2 1 5 8 
Subtotal 12 10 18 40 
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Finally, donor agencies and INGOs rarely demonstrate accountability 
to their local partners despite the fact that the majority of partner 
NGOs are selected on the basis of changeable criteria and/or 
personal connections. Donors accountability requirements of NGOs 
can be too bureaucratic, selective; ad hoc, extensive or sketchy and 
their enforcement subjective given their history of relationship with 
the organizations in question. Donors are completely aware of NGOs 
needs for improved internal governance; leaderships, systems and 
practices necessary to strengthen their accountability practices. Yet 
donors fail to recognize that they too are in need for such 
improvements themselves, at least to be less controlling, make their 
own decision-making more transparent and less top-down while try to 
build a relationship with fund recipient NGOs on equal footing.  
 
4.10 Accountability to Future Generation and National Goals 
NGOs accountability to national goals and future generations also 
tend to be weak as reported by 43% to 48% of surveyed managers 
and 55% to 58% of surveyed staff. Table 6.20 also points out that 
staffs were the most self-critical of respondents with 58% stating that 
this accountability is indeed less than satisfactory to them. Managers 
are either satisfied or unhappy about their performance. It is 
however, interesting to see from the percentages that respondents 
seem to equate national goals with the interests of Palestinian future 
generations. This is indeed a very political perception and a new spin 
on the concept of sustainability unique to the organizations in the 
oPt. It is possible to infer that, under occupation, politics is the major 
determiner of the future of Palestinian people than, say, sustainable 
development or sustainable natural resources.  
 
Table 19: NGOs Accountability to National Goals& Future 
Generations by Surveyed Group 
Statement Group Weak Satisfactory Good 
Accountability towards 
Palestinian national goals  
Mgt. 42.5% 37.5% 20% 
Staff 58% 32% 10% 
Accountability towards 
future generations 
Mgt. 47.5% 37.5% 15% 









Moreover, Table 6.21 reveals that in terms of NGO generations, the 
politically affiliated mass organizations of the 1970s and 1980s are 
found to be least accountable as stated by 77% of this subsector who 
described this accountability as weak. This contradicts the 
assumption or popular view that the earlier, pre-Oslo generation is by 
default more attuned to national goals and struggle because of their 
participation in popular resistance and voluntary community action 
for decades before the post-Oslo generations were sprung.  
Interestingly, about 57.5% of urban NGOs and 35% of CBOs 
describe their accountability as satisfactory and/or good. Similarly, 
advocacy organizations seem equally divided (50%) between those 
who believe in their responsible national and future orientation and 
those who do not. About 88% of institutions with a combined 
advocacy and service delivery mandate are the most satisfied with 
their performance compared to 41% of service-only organizations. 
This may be explained by NGOs tendency to run a mixture of 
services, advocacy and relief programs, all of which are necessary for 
the Palestinian people and to social groups and local communities in 
particular, depending on their specific needs (DW., interview, 22 
April). 
 
Table 20: Accountability to Future Generation & National Goals, 
by Type of Organization 
Type 
Accountability to Future 
Generations 
Accountability to National Goals 
Weak  
Satisf
actory  Good  Total Weak  
Satisfac
tory  Good  Total 
NGO 6 7 4 17 4 9 4 17 
CBO 13 8 2 23 13 6 4 23 
Subtotal 19 15 6 40 17 15 8 40 
Advocacy 4 1 3 8 1 5 2 8 
Services 14 8 2 24 13 6 5 24 
Combined  1 6 1 8 3 4 1 8 
Subtotal 19 15 6 40 17 15 8 40 
Before 
1990s 
7 2 0 9 
5 1 3 9 
1991-2000 3 6 4 13 5 6 2 13 
2001-2010 9 7 2 18 7 8 3 18 
Subtotal 19 15 6 40 17 15 8 40 
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To sum up the answers to the main question on which stakeholders 
NGOs are accountable to, the findings indicate that respondents 
believe that NGOs should, at least in theory, be accountable first to 
the public; although in reality they are accountable first to their 
donors. This is commonly agreed upon by the sample organizations. 
The surveyed BoD members, managers and staff stated that NGOs 
ranked second on their list accountability towards the Palestinian 
public. But in fact, NGOs priorities accountability to PA after donors 
because NGOs do not give much importance to the facets or 
dimensions of accountability to public and local community such as 
reporting, public participation in NGO decision making, 
incorporation of public needs and priorities into NGO programming, 
and disclosure of NGO information to the public.  
 
5 NGOs Legitimacy and Identity  
During focus group discussions and interviews, participants made the 
link between the issues of NGO transparency and legitimacy and 
alluded to four forms or sources of legitimacy for Palestinian non-
profit organizations: legal, representational, participatory and societal.  
 
5.1. Legal Legitimacy 
As of 2000, all organizations working in the oPT, including the pre-
Oslo generation, were obliged to (re)register with the MoI as not-for 
profit societies. The PA considers all unregistered groups, or those 
that have not re-registered in accordance to Law No (1) of 2000, as 
illegitimate although the society may be more tolerant of non-
registration or official seal of approval if the group adopts socially-
relevant objectives and activities. Older organizations maintain their 
formal structures and political affiliations but they are also obliged to 
follow official accountability requirements.  
             6.5.2 Representational Legitimacy 
Not all non-profit organizations have membership-based GAs thus 
passing the representatives of their real constituencies (i.e. youth, 
women, farmers, etc.) for a closed group of founders that take over 
organizations’ governance structures. Close-membership entails that 








for participation in internal elections, and benefiting from the 
organization’s services or both. As in any institutions, powerful GA 
and/or BoD members dictate the results of elections in accordance 
with the interest of their factions or their own interests.  
The major question about the link between governance and 
legitimacy is whether democratic elections, or lack thereof, cause the 
organization to maintain or lose its legitimacy. Eventually, the 
effectiveness and active participation of BoD members is more critical 
to the NGO’s continued legitimacy. This applies to the pre-Oslo 
popular mass organizations that lost a chunk of their members to new 
NGOs for this reason. Today these organizations face a democracy 
crisis since no elections has been held for long time (MD., interview, 
16 March). Both phenomena result in monopolized or centralized 
decision-making in the organizations and a disconnect from the 
grassroots and a loss of legitimacy stemming from the complete 
exclusion of the public from governance and decision-making 
processes. Participants stated that having local branches, centers and 
tangible services can enhance the legitimacy of NGOs and all types of 
non-profit organizations. The potential for greater legitimacy also 
hinges on overall transparency and adherence to membership criteria 
and written internal bylaws on the members’ rights and duties as well 
as the policies and procedures to follow and ensure accountability. 
Furthermore, even with a wide base of volunteers, an organization 
still faces legitimacy questions and doubts because volunteers are 
mobilized causally or paid for their contribution, a practice that goes 
against the very concept of voluntarism in the public’s mind. 
 
5.3. Participatory Legitimacy  
How organizations take decisions are conveyed them to the public 
turns out to be the major determining factor behind the 
unquestioned legitimacy by the public. In political institutions and 
other types of organizations, people (s)elect their representatives and 
delegate to them the responsibility for policy-setting and decision-
making while those representatives remain accountable to the people.  
The above means that Palestinian NGOs will strengthen their 
legitimacy when they become more communicative with the public 
about the decision-making processes. Historically and prior to the 
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creation of PA, factions ran most NGOs, took decisions on their 
behalf, and resolved their problems all within the structures of the 
political parties and according to their interests. By working very close 
to the people, non-profit organizations were less vertical in their 
structure (Sbieh, 2011). Today, the political ties still persist but non-
profit organizations conceal their political nature and relations by 
attempting to narrow down the decision making circles to a very few 
trusted individuals and donors, scarifying public participation in the 
process. But when things get tough with PA, these NGOs ask the 
political factions to confront the problem on their behalf (Sbieh, 
2011).  
After 1990, NGOs speech replaced the ‘public’ and ‘constituencies’ 
with a new terminology of ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘target groups’ thus 
rendering them untitled for participation in decision making and 
pushing them away from voluntary engagement in NGOs to not-
believing in or supporting the non-profit sector entirely. By doing so, 
the decision-making process reversed its direction to become top-
down instead of bottom-up (Hamammi, 2000; Sbieh, 2011), made 
worse by the project-based approach to NGO work. Today, proposals 
promise donors that funding will be used to generate jobs and 
income for the poor and the unemployed because donors reject the 
real objective which is to protect Palestinians land from Israeli 
confiscation through agricultural development and extending support 
to farmers (Sbieh, 2011).  
The growing disconnection between NGOs and public in the post-PA 
formation era with regard to NGO governance and mandates 
undermines their legitimacy in the public eyes. Some organizations 
opted to address the issue by increasing GA membership and 
grassroots involvement and enhancing cooperation with local 
counterparts. Others left their visions and mandates to be 
determined solely by few individual leaders. Those who follow the 
first option are looked upon favourably by the public, particularly 
when they cooperate with other local actors such as village councils 
and municipalities, or work under their umbrellas. The public’s 
scepticism grows when this coordination is limited to institutions of 
the same political affiliations or to the implementation of separate 








Organizational legitimacy could easily be enhanced if NGOs maintain 
a closer proximity to their populations through running local 
branches and centers, but most importantly though the inclusion of 
local communities in decision-making and NGOs functioning along 
with people’s needs and priorities. Participatory need assessments and 
bottom-up planning then become insufficient to guarantee people 
trust if not followed by systematic public participation in 
implementation and monitoring of relevant programs designed in 
essence to satisfy actual needs to achieve a wider developmental and a 
positive, long lasting impact.  
However, oPt communities have no real role in NGOs program 
development, fundraising or donor relations all of which consume 
the energy of an organization and its leadership. Weak organizational 
and service sustainability independently from foreign funding also 
cast serious shadows not only on the organization’s accountability but 
also on its legitimacy in case it could not be sustained on local 
resources alone. Moe importantly, it will also question the main 
reason behind the creation of this organization in the first place 
unless it stays somehow relevant to the community  (Awashra, 2011).  
 
5.4 Societal Legitimacy and Continued Relevance of NGOs 
Due to the multiplicity of social demands, many Palestinian 
organizations run a wide range of activities. In itself, it is not seen as a 
negative thing. Nevertheless focus group participants were more 
concerned with the unfair distribution of benefits and activities 
because of NGOs tendency to apply selective exclusion and/or pre-
selection criteria irrelevant of need. On the other hand, the 
community tends to self-exclude if the NGO is perceived as having 
political ideas different from the community, unless direct financial 
or other benefits are offered to potential participants for the 
purpose easing rejection 9 . Relevance aside, the focus groups 
explained that local communities usually accept activities and services 
                                                          
9
 It's worth noting that PYU took decided to shun away from hiring political 
supporters as local coordinators and volunteers. “We decided to check the 
political identity at the center’s door”, said one coordinator. PYU women center in 
Beit Rima went even further and decided not even to discuss politics in the center 
in order to avoid any conflict between the women beneficiaries themselves or 
between the center and the community.  
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of educational, cultural or economic nature, but are more hesitant to 
participate in or seek activities carrying political overtones or activities 
that aim to effect social changes in relation to gender, democracy, 
conflict resolution, human rights, or promotion of social justice10. 
The ‘more acceptable’ types of activities have limited or immediate 
positive impact on individuals unlike the social change variety 
perceived as ‘luxurious’, ‘unrealistic’ or ‘contradictory to the 
community’s believes, values and best interests’ (Beit Rima focus 
group, 4 April). 
The same group also indicated that while communities welcome 
interventions that impart skills and tangible benefits, ironically they 
end up enforcing social change more than ‘awareness-raising’ 
activities they fear. For example, women empowerment workshops 
rarely have concrete outcomes unlike income-generation or 
productive projects that ultimately enhance women’s powers within 
the family and immediate community 11 . Focus group participants 
gave many anecdotes of women who actively participate in familial 
decision-making or developed persuasion skills to help older 
generations accept new idea or practices such as mixed-gender 
activities, women’s employment, and men’s assumption of further 
reproductive roles within the family. 
In addition, people’s perception of organizational legitimacy is 
directly linked to its financial stability. Both are mutually reinforcing 
and the lack of either one gives rise to the familiar claim of being 
called ‘donor-driven’. In addition, organizations share common 
points of weakness most importantly the intensive investment on 
donor funding over quality and continuity of services. Thus more 
                                                          
10
 Many focus groups participants, especially women, expressed disinterest in 
participation in political activities such as peaceful street marches, protests or sit-
ins although they were more receptive to taking part in educational activities that 
do not put them in direct confrontation with their families and/or with Palestinian 
and Israeli authorities  
11
 NGOs and donors are to blame for this popular view on the automatic link 
between increased income and women’s empowerment on the assumption that 
women will definitely have total control over the new resources. NGOs want to 
prove the positive impact of their projects and minimize community’s resistance. 
In fact, studies around the world have shown that women’s only economic 
projects have detrimental consequences on women because they change the 








organizations now tend to increase their revenues by creating their 
own income generation activities such as PC repair, child care 
centers, and catering services even when already proven unable to 
generate sufficient income or guarantee financial sustainability for the 
organization.  
However, given that some NGOs have financial capability larger than 
political parties and some ministries (Sbieh, 2011), the public grew 
suspicious of these organizations, especially when their activities are 
of the non-service, ‘luxurious’ type. Dire financial resources weaken 
political parties and force their leaders to use the same tactics NGOs 
used for fund-raising from local and foreign sources. It also offers an 
explanation for political leaders search to secure paid positions in 
NGO top management or in the voluntary BoDs in the hope they 
shortly transition to paid management. This may consolidate the 
persons’ political power or social standing yet the downside of this 
overlap is the creation of closed circles of profiteering elites, alliances 
and coalitions on the account of people plight, both of which 
eventually undermine political parties and non-profit organizations 
alike.  
One of the case studies involves two local women’s organizations in 
Beita12, WDS and UPWC, engaged in poverty reduction and public 
policy dialogue, and women’s participation and economic 
empowerment. Their projects target women, poor families, and 
marginalized groups through small-scale economic activities such as 
home gardens, animal husbandry, food processing and handicrafts in 
addition to necessary technical training in these areas and workshops 
to raise women’s health, social and legal awareness.  
Despite the similarity of their programs, both have different histories, 
mandates and working methods. UPWC seeks to “enable Palestinian 
national movement and women movement in particular to continue 
                                                          
12
 Four organizations are covered the case study in Beita, a rural town of 12,000 
inhabitants located 12 KM to south east of Nablus city. These CBOs are Beita 
Women Development Society (WDS), a local branch of the Union of Palestinian 
Women’s Committee (UPWC), Beita Youth and Sport Centre, and Beita 
Charitable Society. UPWC is affiliated to PFLP and belongs to the 1980s 
generation of mass organizations while WDS was registered in 2007 and is 
affiliated to Fateh although perceived by the local community as less political than 
UPWC.  
Vol. 5 No. 2 




struggle against the Israeli occupation and achieve national 
independence” (UPWC website, 2011). UPWC works against the PA 
economic and political polices than deepen oPt dependence on 
Israeli economy and work with women’s cooperatives presented as an 
alternative to the PA-supported capitalist economic model (KT., 
interview, 10 May). It allows individuals and groups who do not 
receive welfare assistance from the MoSA for whatever reason to 
support them. On the other hand, WDS adopts the mainstream 
micro and small investment to poverty reduction through 
engagement with individual women of low economic status. 
Certainly, UPWC is not the only organization with a preference for 
cooperatives. It is a popular approach among left affiliation NGOs 
because it enables people to “refuse handouts, adopt collective 
approach to identify solutions for their problems, share common 
values, and enhance their consciousness” (A.J., interview, 27 March). 
At a higher level the approach encourages people to take initiatives, 
introduce useful changes to their communities, and develop 
horizontal networks and relationships based on cooperation rather 
than power or stratification. Others claim that the left parties and 
factions promote cooperatives as a way to maintain public support 
through provision of some economic benefits (Kafreyat focus group, 
19 March).  
UPWC and WDS are avid advocates of collective economic 
approaches and dependence on local resources, whether land, raw 
material, human capital, or social relations. NGOs are not aware that 
micro-enterprise is designed to relief the state from its obligations 
towards the public or that they promote self-exploitation among the 
poor by engaging into very primitive and labour-intensive economic 
activities. They hardly make sufficient cash for their owners or 
generate large-scale employment as they tend not to create a host of 
support economic activities and services to generate good economy 
(NR., interview, 21 March). Even when cooperatives find support 
from communities and activists, economists believe that cooperatives 
work on a too-small scale to build a national economy. Unless they 
scale-up their economic operations, and receive the PA’s political 








would be sustainable or economically profitable (NR., interview, 12 
March).  
Sometimes, people’s practices contradict their beliefs and interests13. 
Both UPWC and WDS do not plan projects at all or involve women 
directly if they do so that two premises are already violated: economic 
empowerment and women’s participation. One BoD member stated 
that 
“Women are bored of awareness workshops but they need real 
projects to generate some income for their families. The women are 
not asked if they want training or workshops on human rights and 
citizenship. As you know, the answer will be NO because people are 
not ready for democracy and human rights, or see that as one of their 
priorities” (KT., interview, 10 May). 
 
Another GA member in the youth centre said: 
“We do not need trainers coming to lecture us on democracy, get 
paid then go home. We know what democracy is because we did 
experience it in our daily life and national struggle. Before inviting 
people to democracy sessions, CBOs have to help in securing many 
basic needs. How can you convince a disabled, 40 years old man to 
attend such sessions when he could not secure long term medical 
treatment to his injured leg unless of course we offer him something 
more interesting?” (M.Moh., interview, 10 May). 
 
To allow the public to decide requires two-way communication and 
constant dialogue to determine their needs and priorities. 
Organisational priorities must take into account both sets of group 
and individual needs but must give primacy to group’s needs. For 
example; 
When we started, men opposed us and banned their wives and sisters 
from attending our activities. After a while, men changed their 
positions and encouraged their women to register and benefit from 
                                                          
13
 For example Palestinian people believe that Israeli will not end its occupation 
of oPt, and is least likely to be pressured by the US and the UN to end it but when 
the Palestinians become stronger they can force Israel to withdraw. Not many 
people are working on ensuring Palestinian strength. In addition, many 
organizations run after donors’ funds for financial support despite being critical of 
foreign aid and donors agendas. 
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our projects. This is because we selected family-relevant activities, 
such as child-rearing, home economy, nutrition and other stuff 
possible to execute without a budget yet capable of attracting 
housewives and have direct results on the health of their families 
(BA., interview, 10 May). 
 
That is WDS gained men’s trust by selecting activities agreeable to 
men and women and by showing men the direct economic benefit 
they gain out of women’s participation in WDS projects. But this may 
not be the only reason, because no man in Beita would accept 
Palestinian women’s work in Israeli settlements regardless of the 
resultant economic benefits14.  
What can be inferred from the above case studies are? 
1. Legitimacy is derived only from the public because people do 
not trust inactive NGOs or those that neglect public interests. 
2. CBOs have a more politically diverse membership base, thus 
political parties tend to be highly involved in their BoDs elections 
and composition and by doing so sacrifice organizational harmony 
and unity. The majority of Beita participants agreed that political 
parties’ interference in organizational issues led to the weakening of 
these organizations.  
3. Because their ultimate objective is to strengthen their 
members, politically affiliated NGO are always biased and focus on 
benefitting their supporters and party members without necessarily 
being corrupt.  
 
Conclusion  
The findings presented in this article illustrated the status of 
accountability to external stakeholders based on the premise that the 
non-profit sector is by definition concerned with public welfare and 
meeting their needs. The findings highlighted the failure of NGOs in 
meeting the most pressing needs of the public and the poor in 
particular. The upward-accountability also signals of the sector’s 
                                                          
14
 To show that culture is important, Jericho women have openly worked in Israeli 
settlements close to Jerusalem and many claim that they have encouraged by their 








inability to consolidate its legitimacy or define an agenda or develop 
down-ward accountability. On top of that, political parties’ 
involvement in the non-profit organizations is another factor that has 
compounded the sector’s lack of public accountability, negative 
competitiveness, fragmentation, self-serving leadership, and 
exploitation as a substitute of political arena.  In NGOs’ opinion, the 
relationships to various stakeholders range from satisfactory to good 
especially where the PA, foreign donors, and political factions are 
concerned. The PA’s hostility towards NGOs stems from suspicion of 
their political or donor affiliations and NGOs critique of PA policies 
and performance. However, NGOs accountability flows towards two 
powerful external stakeholders, the donors and the PA. 
Consequently, the NGOs are more concerned with upward 
accountability than with down-ward ones such as to the general 
public and the non-profit sector as a whole.  
Within this context, NGOs and CBOs believe that a delicate balance 
can be achieved with the PA and political factions. With the PA, the 
NGOs suggest a greater role for line ministries in NGO oversight and 
regulation instead of assigning the MoI absolute power. The political 
factions can help consolidate NGOs external accountability without 
interference in NGOs affairs and functions. Moreover, political 
parties/factions can coordinate their activities and link their strategic 
visions, working in parallel with NGOs and public authorities to 
enhance national identity and collective rights. NGOs should focus 
on empowering people and support their steadfastness by delivering 
services and directing their accountability to constituencies, local 
communities, and the public at large.  Finally, NGOs accountability 
dilemma is both a cause and a result of low level of public 
participation in NGOs affairs due to public’s lack of trust and the 
general feeling that NGOs are distant, self-absorbed, and wasting 
foreign funds on activities lacking sufficient relevance to actual needs. 
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